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REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT OF CASES ARISING UNDER
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
THE Federal Employers' Liability Act 1 was designed to provide railroad
workers with a possibility of obtaining compensation for injuries sustained
in interstate commerce free from the incubus of the defenses allowed
employers by the common law. 2 It abolished the historic fellow servant
rule; it established the doctrine of "comparative negligence" 3 in place of
the defense of contributory negligence; and it eliminated from the risks
1. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 (1926).
2. SEN. REP. 432, 61st Cong. 2d Sess., March 22, 1910, p. 2. See Brandeis,
J., dissenting in New York Central Ry. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 14'7, 164 (1916):
"The common law liability for fault was to be restored by removing the abuses
which prevented its full and just operation. The liability of the employer under
the federal act as at common law, is merely a penalty for wrong doing."
3. The doctrine that each litigant shall be penalized to the extent of his
own negligence was early adopted in Illinois (Galens and Chicago Union Ry.
Co. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858)) and Georgia (Macon and Western Ry. Co. v.
Davis, 18 Ga. 679 (1855)).
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a worker might assume those dangers arising from the use of machinery
disapproved by the Safety Appliance Act.4  In addition, both the state
and federal courts were made available for suits under the statute and
railroad workers were apparently assured the opportunity to sue in state
courts without fear of removal, by provision that a case could not be removed
from state to federal court for diversity of citizenship. The state courts
were to administer the act as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. "One uniform rule of liability in all the states" was to result.5
The present study is based upon the relevant decisions of the Supreme
Court from October Term 1925 through October Term 1931, and upon
those decisions of the state courts in which application for certiorari was
denied during the same period. The Supreme Court of the United States
during this period reviewed forty-two decisions of state courts on cer-
tiorari proceedings. 6 Of these, thirty-seven were reversed and five affirmed.
Eleven cases, of which ten were reversed, were appealed on the basis of
the minor defenses allowed under the statute.7 In thirty-one of the cases
the defense was based upon assumed risk or insufficiency of evidence of
negligence on the part of the railroad company, and of this group, four
judgments for the plaintiff were affirmed.8 The remainder were reversed
on the ground that evidence of assumed risk was so strong,
9 or proof of the
4. 27 STAT. 531 (1893), 45 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
5. ROBERTS, INJURIES TO INTERsTATE EMPLOYEES (1915) 38.
6. Over the same period, opinions -were -written in only two cases in which
jurisdiction was taken on certiorari to the lower federal courts. The case of
Chicago and Eastern Illinois Rr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 284 U. S. 296
(1932), is not considered in this study. In that case the Supreme Court affirmed
a judgment for plaintiff under the Illinois' Workmen's Compensation Act, de-
ciding that the plaintiff was engaged in intrastate commerce and therefore the
state and not the federal act was applicable.
7. Statute of limitations: Reading Ry. Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58 (1926);
Baltimore, Ohio and Southwestern Ry. v. Carroll, 280 U. S. 491 (1930); Flynn
v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Ry. Co., 283 U. S. 53 (1931) (state
court judgment for plaintiff affirmed). Interstate commerce: Chicago and
Northwestern Ry. v. Bolle, 284 U. S. 74 (1931); New York, New Haven and
Hartford v. Bezue, 284 U. S. 415 (1932). Survival of cause of action: Chicago,
Baltimore and Quincey Ry. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S. 161 (1927).
Computation of damages: Gulf, Colorado and San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Moser,
275 U. S. 133 (1927). Petition for writ of prohibition to prevent state court
from taking jurisdiction of Employers' Liability case: Denver and Rio Grande
Ry. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932). Validity of release signed by employee:
Mellen v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335 (1928). Misconduct of counsel in trial of
case: Minneapolis, St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520 (1931). Fraud
in procurement of position: Minneapolis, St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Rock, 279 U. S.
410 (1929).
8. Minnesota, St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406 (1926); Western
and Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496 (1929); New York Central Ry.
Co. v. Marconi, 281 U. S. 345 (1930); Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Guidry,
280 U. S. 531 (1930).
9. Assumed risk was recognized as a complete defense in eight cases:
Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 271 U. S. 218 (1926); Toledo, St. Louis
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company's negligence so weak 10 that a verdict should have been directed
for the railroad company. The cases were taken from the highest courts
of appeal of nineteen states.
I I. CASES IN WHICH CERTIORARI WAS GRANTED
State J,
Arkansas
Connecticut
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Minnesota
Missouri
Mississippi
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Totals
udgment for Affirmed by
Plaintiff in State Court
Trial Court of Appeal
1 1
Affirmed by
United
States
Supreme
Court
1
1
1
Reversed by
United
States
Supreme
Court
1
Judgment for
Do endant
in Stato
Courts
1
1
8
2
1
1
41 41 4 37 1 1
Ry. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165 (1928); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Leitch,
276 U. S. 429 (1928); Delaware and Lackawanna Ry. Co. v. Koske, 279 U. S.
7 (1929); New York Central Ry. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U. S. 486 (1930); Chesa-
peake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U. S. 44 (1931); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co.
v. David, 284 U. S. 460 (1932); Tyner v. Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co., 278 U. S.
565 (1929). The last case was reversed in a memorandum opinion on the
authority of Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Leitch, supra, and Chicago, Mil-
waukee and St. Paul Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472 (1926). A dissent was filed
in the lower court on the ground that the plaintiff should be held to have
assumed the risk and that the evidence of negligence was insufficient. In citing
the Leitch case and the Coogan case as its authority for the reversal, the
court apparently relied upon both grounds.
10. Twenty cases were reversed because of failure of proof of negligence
or of proximate cause: Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan,
271 U. S. 472 (1926); Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Southwell, 275 U. S. 64
(1927); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Alby, 275 U. S. 426 (1928); Gulf, Mobile
and Northern Ry. v. Wells, 275 U. S. 455 (1928); Unadilla Valley Ry. Co. v.
Caldine, 278 U. S. 139 (1929); Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Davis, 279 U. S.
34 (1929); Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U. S. 587 (1929);
Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Driggers, 279 U. S. 787 (1929); Atlanta and
Charlotte Ry. Co. v. Green, 279 U. S. 821 (1929) (memorandum opinion citing
AfIrmed by
1111ilrd
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steresa
out
1
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It will be seen that seven cases were taken from the so-called north-
eastern states. Of this number two were affirmed, one for plaintiff" and
one for defendant.12 The latter was the only decision of the entire group
of 42 cases in which judgment was entered for the defendant in the state
courts. The remaining thirty-five were brought up from states where
juries and courts are reputedly hostile to railroad companies. In this
group only three judgments were allowed to stand.13
The Supreme Court dealt with these cases summarily. Each case was
considered in the light of its own facts. Conventional concepts were the
basis of decision; no dissents were filed. The purpose of a number of
these decisions is evident. Some were cases where the railroads were
clearly treated unfairly.14 A few were cases where the state courts had
set precedents which might have proved harmful had they been allowed
to stand.15 But the opinions in the remainder showed no such reasons
for the Court's action in granting certiorari or in reversing and remanding
to the state court. The decisions generally, therefore, do not indicate
-whether the Supreme Court is using its power of review to accomplish
a uniform administration of the statute, or merely to defeat injustice in
particular cases.
It would be natural to expect a high degree of similarity in the ad-
ministration of the Act by the state courts, and in its administration
by the Supreme Court. Identical substantive rules of law operate and
the same precedents apply. The construction of the Act by the Supreme
Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan); Chesapeake and Ohio
Ry. Co. v. Mihas, 280 U. S. 102 (1929); Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Toops, 281 U. S.
251 (1930); Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Powe, 283 U. S. 401 (1931); Denver
and Rio Grande Ry. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932); Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U. S. 458 (1932); Southern Ry. Co. v. Moore,
284 U. S. 581 (1932); Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. Temple, 285 U. S. 143 (1932);
Southern Ry. v. Youngblood, 286 U. S. 313 (1932); Baltimore, Ohio and South-
-western Ry. Co. v. Berry, 286 U. S. 272 (1932); Southern Ry. Co. v. Dantzler,
286 U. S. 318 (1932); St. Louis and Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Simpson, 286 U. S.
346 (1932); cf. Toledo, St. Louis Ry. v. Allen, 276 U. S. 165 (1928) (reversed
also for lack of evidence of negligence, supra note 9).
11. New York Central Ry. Co. v. Marcone, 281 U. S. 345 (1930).
12. Flynn v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Ry. Co., 283 U. S. 53
(1931).
13. Minnesota, St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406 (1926); Western
and Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496 (1929); Texas and Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Guidry, 280 U. S. 531 (1930).
14. As in Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Southwell, 275 U. S. 64 (1927)
-where a workman -was killed in a fight which occurred on company property.
See also Mellon v. Goodyear, 277 U. S. 335 (1928); Minneapolis, St. Paul and
Sault Ste. Ry. Co. v. Rock, 279 U. S. 410 (1929).
15. See Gulf, Colorado and San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Moser, 275 U. S. 133
(1927) -where the state court had departed materially from the prescribed
method of computing the damages. In Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58
(1926) the action -was brought over seven years after the employee's death.
The state court allowed a recovery on the ground that the statute of limitations
-did not begin to run until after the appointment of the administrator.
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Court was supposed to avoid the possibility that the liability of interstate
carriers would become a matter of "geography of the states and not of
one supreme law applying uniformly within its exclusive domain." 10 But
the state courts in the decisions included in this study: i.e., those in which
application for certiorari was granted '(Figure I) or denied (Figure II),
display an attitude antithetic to that of the United States Supreme Court.
II. CASES IN WHICH CERTIORARI WAS DENIED
Affirmed by Reversed by Afflirmed by
State Total Found for State State Fownd for Stato
Number Plaintiff in Supreme Supreme Defendant in Supremo
of Cases Trial Court Court Court Trial Court Court
Alabama 9 9 9
Arkansas 9 9 9
California 3 3 3
Colorado 1 1 1
Connecticut 2 2 2
Georgia 3 2 2 1 1
Illinois 6 6 4 2
Indiana 5 5 5
Kansas 4 4 4
Kentucky 2 2 2
Michigan 2 2 2
Minnesota 4 4 2 2
Mississippi 5 4 3 1 1 1
Missouri 24 24 21 3
Nebraska 1 1 1
New Hampshire 1 1 1
New Jersey 6 5 4 1 1 1
New York 5 5 5
North Carolina 6 6 6
Ohio 1 1 1
Oklahoma 5 5 5
Oregon 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 7 4 1 3 3 3
South Carolina 6 6 5 1
Texas 15 15 15
Virginia 1 1 1
Washington 1 1 1
West Virginia 3 3 3
Wisconsin 1 1' 1
Wyoming 1 1 1
Totals 140 134 118 16 6 6
In the 182 cases studied (Figures I and II), twenty-three plaintiffs
applied for certiorari. Only one, however, was granted a review by the
Supreme Court.' 7 Applications for writs were filed by the railroad in
159 cases over the same period, 41 of which were granted. It must be
16. ROBERTS, op. cit. suprv note 5, at 38.
17. Flynn v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Ry. Co., supra noto 12.
assumed that the 159 cases which the railroad appealed from the state
courts were those in which the railroad believed it had the best chance for
a reversal. But regardless of the possible merit of the railroad's case,
the fact remains that of the cases in which the Supreme Court took
jurisdiction, the state courts decided for the railroad in only 2%o, while
the Supreme Court decided for the railroad in 90% .'1
The abolition of the fellow servant rule has had a negligible effect upon
the decisions qf the Supreme Court. The Court has merely invoked the
defense of assumed risk to serve the same purpose for which the fellow
servant rule formerly was used.19 Indeed, it is difficult to discern a
justification for abolishing the one defense and retaining the other. Before
the passage of the statute, they were so completely interdependent that
to throw aside the one and keep the other was almost self-contradictory.
- 0
The servant undertook the performance of his contract on the assump-
tion that the master would not be responsible for the negligent acts of
certain of his fellow servants. He was said to have assumed the risk
of such negligence as well as other risks of his employment. Today in the
Supreme Court, he is held to have assumed all of the ordinary and many
of the extraordinary risks of his employment.
2 1 The facts of the cases
indicate that these include acts of his fellow servants, although no exact
delimitation can be made of the extent to which the abolition of the fellow
servant rule decreased the list of risks which an employee assumes. Eight
18. If it be assumed that denial of certiorari should be treated as affinmance
of the state decision for this purpose, it nevertheless appears that the Supreme
Court decided for the railroad in 33% of the cases, while the state courts decided
for the railroads in 13%.
19. HEARINGs BEFORE THE COAVAIMitEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON H. R. 239
(1906). A representative of the railway employees urged the injustice of a
hypothetical case where "A" an injured passenger was allowed to recover for
injuries caused by the negligence of the engineer where "B" a conductor on
the same train would be precluded from recovery by the fellow servant rule.
The Supreme Court in Chicago and Milwaukee Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377
(1884) refused to apply the fellow servant rule to a kindred situation where
the engineer brought suit to recover for the negligence of the conductor. In
a later case, Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368 (1893) the
Court applied the fellow servant rule and held that a fireman could not recover
for the negligence of the engineer. Since the passage of the Employers' Lia-
bility Act numerous decisions have held that employees assume the risks of
the negligence of the engineer. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Nixon, 271
U. S. 218 (1926); Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Driggers, 279 U. S. 787 (1929).
20. "Both fellow servants" stated Baron Alderson in Priestly v. Fowler,
3 M. & W. 1 (1837) "have engaged in a common service the duties of which
impose a certain risk on each of them, and in case of negligence on the part
of the other, the party injured knows that the negligence is that of his fellow
servant and not of his master. . . . The servant knew when he accepted his
position that there might be a want of due care on the part of his fellow, and
he must be supposed to have contracted on the terms that, as between himself
and his master, he would run the risk, a risk which he must be taken to have
agreed to run when he entered into the defendant's services."
21. Delaware, Lackawana and Western Ry. Co. v. Koske, 279 U. S. 7 (1929).
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of the thirty-seven cases reversed by the Supreme Court were based upon
error of the trial court in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant on
the basis of the evidence that the plaintiff had assumed the particular
risk of his employment.
In the state courts there is no dissension from the Supreme Court on
premises. All agree that the employee assumes the ordinary risks of his
employment,22 the "simple tool doctrine" 23 is recognized, and homage is
paid in dicta to the necessity of a directed verdict where the evidence
shows conclusively that the plaintiff assumed the risks.2 4 These doctrines,
however, were used by state courts to reverse a trial court judgment in
favor of the plaintiff in only 6 of the 182 cases included in this study.
The Act allows recovery only where the negligence of the company is
proved as the proximate cause of the injury.25 Thus it is clear that where
the negligence of the plaintiff is the whole cause of the accident, " or
where the plaintiff fails to prove the existence of the company's negligence27
and the direct causal, connection of such negligence with the injury,2 8 no
recovery can be had. In the Supreme Court, in twenty of the thirty-soven
cases reversed, the reversal was based in whole or in part upon the trial
court's error in failing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground
that proof of negligence or of proximate cause was insufficient. But it
would seem that in some of these cases, to say that there was a failure to
prove proximate cause was merely another way of stating that plaintiff
was contributorily negligent.2 9 In the state courts the question was raised
in a great majority of the cases, but in only eight instances were reversals
grounded upon such error.
22. The validity of the defense of assumed risk is, of course, not open to
question. The courts simply hold that it is a question for the jury, and upon
such a basis the judgments are usually affirmed. Chesapeake and Ohio 'Ry. Co.
v. Russo, 163 N. E. 283 (Ind. App. 1928); Berry v. St. Louis and San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 775, 26 S. W. (2d) 988 (1930). In Denver and St. Louis
Ry. v. Lombardi, 87 Colo. 311, 287 Pac. 648 (1930) it was held that plaintiff
assumed the risk of dangers incident to his employment in the vicinity of a
mass of stones, but that he did not assume the risk of negligence of the follow
servant who caused the stones to fall upon him.
23. None of the cases reversed was so decided because of the applicability
of this doctrine. Consult Crouch v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 128 Kan. 26, 276
Pac. 81 (1929); Jackson v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 165 Minn. 58, 205
N. W. 689 (1925).
24. McGary v. Central Ry. Co., 105 N. J. Law 590, 147 Atl. 472 (1929).
25. Atlantic Coastline Ry. Co. v. Driggers, supra note 14.
26. As in Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Berry, 286 U. S. 272 (1932); of.
Southern Ry. v. Youngblood, 286 U. S. 313 (1932).
27. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U. S, 472
(1926).
28. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Mihas, 280 U. S. 102 (1929).
29. Thus, in Southern Ry. Co. v. Youngblood, supra note 26, a conductor's
disobedience of orders was held to be the proximate cause of the injury, and
his administratrix was not allowed to recover for his death. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina (164 S. E. 431) held the company liable for negligence
[Vol. 42
These divergences between the Supreme Court and the state courts have
induced the railroads to consider the Supreme Court as the ultimate court
of appeal in all cases arising under the Act. The fact that applications
for writs of certiorari in 159 out of 182 cases were made by the railroads
is graphic evidence that so far as the companies are concerned, jurisdiction
of employers' liability litigation is still vested in a federal court. One of
the most practical benefits intended by the Act is thus impaired. By the
anti-removal clause the employee was to have untroubled access to the state
courts which were reputed to be more sympathetic to his cause of action,
and in which ie could bring his suit with less expense than in the federal
courts. 30 But the attitude of the Supreme Court toward these cases and
the consequent possibility of securing reversals of the large verdicts for
plaintiffs make it profitable for the railroads to make a practice of applying
for a writ. The road to final adjudication is thus made longer and more
expensive than it was before the Act, with the added probability that
should the employee's case reach the Supreme Court, he will lose. These
facts have furnished the railroads a powerful weapon by which they may
force disadvantageous settlements from their employees. 31
BITUMINOUS COAL AN]) THE SHERMAN ACT-UNITED
STATES v. APPALACHIAN COALS, INC.
THE first case decided under the Sherman Act involved the dissolution of
an association of bituminous coal dealers who were fixing prices through
the medium of a selling agency.1 The year 1899 witnessed the issuance
of its servants in failing to deliver certain orders of departure to the plain-
tiff's intestate. The Supreme Court of the United States admitted the existence
of the negligence, but refused to recognize its casual connection with the injury.
Cf. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Berry, supra note 26; Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Wiles, 240 U. S. 444 (1916).
30. See Hulac v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 194 Fed. '147 (D. Neb.
1912) : "It is a -well recognized fact in judicial history that plaintiffs, in actions
brought by employees against railway companies for damages resulting from
personal injuries, have quite generally and for many years sought to bring
and retain their actions in the state courts, and the fact is 'well attested by
the multitude of applications to remand such cases which have been constantly
presented to the federal courts. The expense of trials and appeals in the
federal courts have been deterrents, and the variance in the rules of law in
such cases has also been well understood."
31. No attempt has been made in this paper to discuss the theoretical merits
or practical disadvantages of a Federal Employers' Liability Act. However, one
conclusion seems to follow from the facts and figures adduced. Whether sub-
stantive definition of the employer's liability is entrusted to State or to Federal
legislative bodies, administration should be vested finally and exclusively in state
agencies.
1. United States v. Jellico Mountain Coal and Coke Co., 46 Fed. 432
(C. C. M. D. Tenn. 1891).
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of an injunction against a similar combination of coal operators,2 and four
years later a group of independent individuals and corporations engaged
in mining coal in Kentucky and West Virginia, who had agreed to sell
their combined product at not less than a minimum price to be fixed by
an executive committee appointed by the producers, was held likewise to
be a combination in restraint of interstate commerce. 3 These early de-
cisions were prophetic not only of the fate of future attempts to organize
the bituminous field, 4 but also of the rock on which they were to founder.
Through the blurring of concepts and issues that accompanies the "judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion" there has persisted consistently the
principle that the ultimate essence of the competition required by the
Sherman Act is the establishment of prices by the free interplay of supply
and demand. 5 Whatever judgment be made of the success of the Sherman
Act, certain it is that judicial interpretation of the anti-trust law has had
the effect of legalizing almost any degree of corporate concentration of
economic power where certain formalities are observed.0 The programs
of loose-knit combinations have been scanned more vigilantly, but recent
cases reveal increasing latitude in permitting exchange of vital informa-
tion among members and more charity in interpreting coincidence of
prices. 7 Clearly the courts, posed with the problem of maintaining a r6gime
2. United States v. Coal Dealers' Ass'n of California, 85 Fed. 252 (N. D.
Cal. 1898).
3. Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 Fed. 610 (C. C. A.
6th, 1902).
4. Chicago, W. & V. Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N. E. 770 (1905) (com-
bination between independent producers of coal held common law conspiracy).
Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871) (five coal companies
in Virginia agreed to divide two coal regions of which they had control and
to market exclusively through a common selling agent). Pocohontas Coke Co.
v. Powhatan Coal and Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 508, 56 S. E. 264 (1906).
5. The decision in United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1926)
brings the law of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S.
290 (1896) down to the present. For exhaustive analysis of this question, see
Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 291; Oliphant, Trade Associations and the Law
(1926) 26 COL. L. R v. 381; remarks of Sharfman on The Anti-Trust Act of
1890 and Trade Associations in HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAws--
-A SYMPOsIUM (1932) 93.
6. Cf. United States v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417 (1920)
(50% control); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32
(1918) 95% control); FETTER, MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931) 362; KEEZER
AND MAY, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS, (1930) 55; Bell, Rule of Unreason in
Restraint of Trade Cases (1926) 12 VA. LAW REG. 129. See WATKINS, IN-
DUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1927) 258.
7. Cf. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371 (1928);
American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, (1921) and
Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. U. S., 268 U. S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass's v. U. S., 268 U. S. 563 (1925). These are discussed in
Oliphant, op. cit. supra note 5. For an account of how these plans may be used
to fix prices see Probst, Failure of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law (1926) 75 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 122. In the later cases, the Court held that the government had
[Vol. 42
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of competition while at the same time permitting to members of combina-
tions those advantages of expert research facilities and long time schedules,
which in the case of mergers have secured productive efficiency, technical
progress and lower prices, are now ready to forgive much in the way of
close cooperations if they are not asked to surrender overtly the ultimate
pearl of competitive price-fixing.0 Returning good for good, business men
have lately permitted to fall into disuse the formerly popular method of
limiting production, fixing prices and eliminating competition by the device
of a common selling agency,' 0 and those desiring to achieve the same result
have preferred to rely upon informal understandings or gentlemen's agree-
ments.".
It is therefore surprising to find the employment of the hoary selling
agency plan in the most recent attempt to bring order into the sorely chaotic
field of bituminous coal. Appalachian Coals, Inc., a corporation organized
by 137 producers of the Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee and Kentucky
fields to market exclusively and to fix the price at which all their coal
should be sold, was part of a contemplated scheme of regional coal-selling
agencies, each of which was to handle in the same manner the coal pro-
duced in a field characterized by common competitive conditions. A three
not proved that price fixing disguised by ostensible dissemination of trade
information was being practiced.
8. It is categorically declared in the cases that not exercise of the power,
but merely potential control of prices, constitutes the illegal element in re-
strictive agreements. Trans-Missouri Freight Association v. United States, mupra
note 5; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 85 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th, 1898),
affd, 175 U. S. 211 (1899); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1916); Swift v.
United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, supra, note 7; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., cupra note 7.
See Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U. S., 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918).
The trend may be seen further in United States v. National Association of
Window Glass Manufacturers, 263 U. S. 403 (1923) and in Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana) v. U. S., 283 U. S. 163 (1930), both discussed in Jones, Historical
Development of Law of Business Competition (1926) 36 YALn L. J. 207; Notes
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 566; (1931) 31 COL. L. Rnv. 1049; (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 1297.
9. This position is taken definitively by the court, in Trenton Potteries Co.
v. United States, supra note 5, by Mr. Justice Stone, who also wrote the opinions
in Maple Flooring Manufacturing Association v. United States, and Cement
Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States, both supra note 7.
10. The illegal status of the selling agency device was established as early
as 1909 in Continental Wall Paper Manufacturing Co. v. Voight & Sons, 212
U. S. 227 (1909).
11. McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAws (1930) 310;
Probst, op. cit. supra note 7. See 1 F. T. C. Report on Home Furnishing
Industry (1923). The success of this policy is illustrated in the field of
bituminous by the case of Commonwealth v. Hatfield Coal Co., 193 Ky. 229,
235 S. W. 722 (1921), in which a corporation engaged in mining, shipping
and selling coal, which sent out from time to time to other dealers in coal printed
circulars containing price lists of various qualities of coal sold by it, and such
other information as would indicate changes in price of the coal handled by
it, was absolved of the charge of fixing prices.
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judge district court held the proposed combination illegal as restraining
interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.1 2 The only novelty in
this combination was its unprecedented magnitude; the chastened spirit in
which the decision was handed down, however, marks the passing of
an epoch.
To a court ruling upon the validity of gimilar combinations of the bitu-
minous industry in the first decade after the enactment of the Sherman
law,'3 it was axiomatic that the self-regulating mechanism of the com-
petitive system could be depended upon to assure to the public an adequate
supply of high-quality products at a reasonable price with the interests of
all involved in the industry efficiently cared for.14 The policy of relying
upon competition has been attempted to an unprecedented degree in the
field of bituminous. In no basic industry except agriculture has the 20th
century movement towards concentration made so little headway.15 Though
thirty producers mine one-third of the total and own more than one-third
of the coal reserves,16 their holdings are scattered, and the largest indi-
vidual operating company produces less than 5% of the annual output of
the country.'7 A similar situation exists in the individual producing
fields.' 8 A survey of the field after the epidemic of bankruptcies attendant
upon the current depression has dispelled the hope that deflation of the
industry10 would solve the problem of overdevelopment of mine capacity
inherited from War conditions. 20 Drastic reduction in productive capacity,
however, has not kept pace with shrinkage in demand. Oil, gas, hydro-
12. United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., U. S. Daily, October 6, 1932,
at 4 (W. D. Va.). Appeal has been filed with the Supreme Court.
13. See notes 1, 2 and 3, supra.
14. For an admirable statement of the theory of the Sherman Act and
the manner of its actual operation in the bituminous field see HAMITON AND
WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1925).
15. Several small local combinations have been effected since 1923, but
in none of the principal soft coal fields is there yet any single corporation or
group of related companies which so dominates the market as to restrict com-
petition and regulate prices. Supra note 14, cl.
16. LAIDLER, CONCENTRATION IN AmERICAN INDUSTRY (1931) 67.
17. Gandy, Some Trends in the Bituminous Coal Industry, (1930) 147
ANNALS 84. In 1928 a total of 6,450 mines produced about 525 million tons:
less than 100 of these companies providing as much as a million tons apiece
and 2,752 producing less than 10,000 tons annually.
18. Ibid.
19. Production dropped 73 million tons comparing 1930 with 1929; another
89 million tons contrasting 1931 with 1930; and, to judge by the figures to date,
perhaps another 55 million tons for the current year below the 1931 figure.
Address of C. E. Bockus, of New York City, President of Clinchfield Coal
Corporation and National Coal Association, The Institute of Public Affairs,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, July 4, -1932.
20. In the five years prior to 1916 average output was about 440 million
tons per year. Under the stimulus of high prices thousands of now mines were
opened during and immediately after the war and the old mines were equipped
with modern machinery with the result that there was an increase to 502
million tons in 1916, to 552 million in 1917 and to 579 million in 1918. Thus
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generated electricity, and improved methods of coal consumption 2 ' have
made serious inroads on the market for bituminous. Consumption of coal
in all of the industries which are* its largest users has shown not only a
marked actual decline but also a substantial decline in its relative position
as a source of energy.2
The reaction in the bituminous field to the present universal dislocation
of business has only served to throw into more lurid relief the lack of
coordination which under the present system, inevitably pervades the in-
dustry. Owing to the seasonal character of the demand for coal,3 and
the virtual impossibility of storing coal at the mine mouth,2-4 the industry
is forced habitually to operate with an excess capacity of about 730 million
tons a year. Though this condition accounts in large measure for prices
below cost, further cutting down of equipped and manned mine capacity
cannot continue if the industry is to remain in readiness to satisfy legiti-
mate demands. 25 The disastrous effect of imposing competition under these
conditions is enhanced by the fact that owing to the inelasticity of the
annual demand for coal, sales are not stimulated by a reduction in price
and a small excess of coal in the market tends further to depress prices.2 0
in three years production increased over 30%. In 1927, 1928, and 1929 there
was a capacity to produce 800 million tons and a market for something over
500 million. Improvements in the technique of mining have been an additional
factor tending toward overproduction. See LAmiLi, op. cit. supra note 16.
21. More efficient use of coal has reduced the fuel consumption of railroads
by 32 million tons per annum from 1916 to 1929, and by the electric industries
by approximately 47 million tons per annum. Address of Van A. Bittner at a
Conference on the Bituminous at Swarthmore College, 'November 7, 1930.
22. In 1916 the coal industry furnished 72% of the total supply of energy
derived from mineral fuels and water power; in 1931 this had dropped to
approximately 48%. From 1916 to 1931 the use of natural gas, in supplying
such energy had increased from 4% to 9%; oil had increased in use from
10.2% to 26% and water power from 4% to 8.5%. The total displacement of
coal by other fuels has amounted to more than 200 million tons of coal per
annum. Brief of Defendant, p. 5.
23. It has been estimated by the Bureau of Mines that the rate of con-
sumption of bituminous coal in January is more than 50% greater than the
rate of consumption in July. Over this fluctuating consumer's demand, prac-
tically no control can be established., Gandy, op. cit. supra note 15, at 85.
24. Physical conditions surrounding the mines particularly in the mountain-
ous Appalachian region of the East preclude the offsetting of lack of orders
in slack seasons by producing and adding to stocks on hand. Other prohibit-
ing elements are the bulkiness of the commodity which would entail the use
of a large storage area if an appreciable effect in equalizing production were
to be obtained, the necessity of breaking down sizes and rehandling the coal
stored, and the added cost of rehandling, which would make lower grade coal
more expensive than newly mined coal. Ibi(L
25. Production at the rate of 730 million tons a year was required in 1926.
In virtue of its position as the basic industrial fuel, capacity to meet such
maximum emergency demand must be maintained in the bituminous field. Ibid.
26. Another factor tending to disorganize the market is the demand at
different seasons for diverse sizes of coal. Since this cannot be satisfied without
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Even closing down in off season provides the unhappy operator no avenue
of escape from the rigors of competition. Since overhead costs continue,
and substantial sums must still be spent in preserving the physical con-
dition of the property, production at a loss persists. 27 Price demoraliza-
tion is also considerably advanced by the prevalence of the practice of
authorizing several different agencies to dispose of the same coal in the
same markets, with the result that an artificial pyramiding of supply is
* obtained in which a given quantity of coal actually competes with itself.2
But it is not only the plight of operators, investors 29 and labor 80 which
is a matter of concern. Through the effect of this disorganization has been
to return immediate dividends to the public in the form of fuel below cost
of production, coal is a wasting resource, and the policy which prolongs
the distressed condition of the industry places a premium upon its deple-
tion. 1 At present prices only the richest veins can be reached, and it
has been estimated that approximately 30% of the coal is thus left in the
ground, where it is lost to future use. 32 Prolonging a competitive race in
thus denuding a natural resource is obviously an indefensible policy, and no
effort is made in the opinion in Appalachian Coals v. United States to
minimize the fact that the present status of the law is unsuited to every
interest involved in the bituminous industry.8 3 However, in view of the
cooperative practices already established as legal, and the unequivocal char-
acter of the scheme employed, a contrary decision would have given full
the production of other sizes, those unordered must be sold for what they will
bring as distress coal or be lost as demurrage.
27. As a result the operator may be constrained to accept not cost prico but
cost less the loss involved in closing down.
28. This situation may account for the predeliction of the operators for
the selling agency scheme of organization. Choice of this plan is, however,
based upon the doubtful assumption that the uneconomic aspects of the industry
are exclusively connected -with the marketing of coal.
29. In 1925, according to the Income Tax Unit, 2,585 companies reported
an aggregate loss of $62,826,452. This was on the basis of a price of $2.06
a ton. By 1928, the price per ton had dropped to $1.80. This was before the
recent depression set in. See LAIDLE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 66.
30. Because of the excess capacity and irregularity of operation, the
bituminous industry ordinarily requires 600,000 men to produce an amount of
coal which could readily be produced each year by 300,000 without increasing
the average daily output per man. ROCHESTER, LABOR AND COAL (1930) 50,
Since 1920 working days have been reduced from 30%o to over 60%, the trade
union control of the soft coal field has declined from some 70% to 20" of the
field and the wage-scale and annual earnings of the miners have become com-
pletely unstable. LAIDLER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 67.
31. Hervey, Anti-Trust Laws and Conservation of Minerals (1930) 147
ANNALS 67.
32. Address by Professor Willits, at A Conference on the Bituminous Coal
Industry held at Swarthmore College, Nov. 7, 1930.
33. The Court said, "We sympathize with the plight of those engaged in
the coal industry whether as operators or as miners; but we have no option but
to declare the law as we find it ..
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legal sanction to the combination to set prices and limit output.-4 The
well known rule of reason, which absolves of illegality any combination
not operating "to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
competition or unduly obstructing the true course of trade" might readily
have been pressed into service to justify this result.3 It is believed that
the court, in referring the defendants to the legislature for relief, took
the sounder course. To proceed with the emasculation of the Sherman Act
would be to deliver once more the full guidance of industry into the hands
of private individuals to be run exclusively for private profit. The diffi-
culty with such a course is not only that if price fixing agreements are
permitted, the element of control in the interest of the public and of labor
is removed, but that there is lacking the assurance that more than a tem-
porary and superficial alleviation of distress within industry would ensue.
Nor would the stipulation that the court retain power to pass upon the
reasonableness of the prices fixed operate to cure these defects.
The emphatic reluctance of the Supreme Court to go into the reason-
ableness of prices in anti-trust cases, and its uncompromising aversion to
legislation establishing any such standard,36 may be attributed not merely
to a determination to cling to the fundamental competitive scheme, but
also to the realization of the inadequacy of the judicial machinery to the
task of formulating the details of a workable economic policy and the
34. P. H. Rhoads, Proposed Changes in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: Their
Necessity and Validity (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 602.
35. Bell, op. cit. supra note 6.
36. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., supra note 8; International Harvest
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216 (1914) (Kentucky Criminal Statute making
"depreciation below market value under normal competitive conditions" the
standard of legality held violation of the 14th Amendment); United States
v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921) (standard of legality "any unjust
or unreasonable rate of charge" in criminal provisions of the Lever Act held
violation of 5th and 6th Amendments); Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining
Company, 267 U. S. 233 (1925) (civil provisions of the Lever Act in which
standard of legality was "any unjust or unreasonable rate of charge" held
invalid); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926) (Oklahoma
Criminal Statute in which standard of legality depended upon "current rate
of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed" held invalid);
U. S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra, note 5 (reasonableness of prices fixed
held no defence from the prohibition of the Sherman Act); Tyson & Brother
v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927) (New York Statute fixing charges of theatre
ticket brokers held violation of the 14th amendment); Fairmont Creamery
Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 (1927) (criminal provision of a Minnesota statute
in which standard of legality depended upon "discriminatory buying in one
locality at higher prices than in another" held violation of the 14th amendment) ;
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445 (1927) (criminal provision of a Colorado
statute in which the standard of legality depended upon whether a combination
in restraint of trade was or was not "necessary to obtain a reasonable profit"
held in violation of the 14th amendment). See Montague, Proposals for Rc-
vision of Anti-Trust Laws, in HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 5.
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futility of the device of litigation to put them into effect.37 It has been
pointed out that the Court is unfitted to determine in an industry of any
complexity whether price or quantity of production is reasonable. The
problem of ascertaining from day to day whether price has become un-
reasonable through the variation of conditions could not be undertaken
by a body schooled in and acting through an alien technique. Judges are
not trained to undertake "a determination which can be satisfactorily
made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a
choice between rival philosophies." 38 Finally, the court could not single
out price fixing in the bituminous field alone for judicial sanction; a de-
cision validating this practice would apply equally to all businesses. Un-.
happy experience in requiring competition in all industries regardless of
their inherent differences should effectively deter any attempt to lay down
another economic rule of universal application. It has been pointed out
in another connection that "The conditions developed in an industry may
be such that those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without
danger to the community. But it is not for judges to determine whether
such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits of permis-
sible contest and to declare the duties which the new situation demands.
This is the function of the legislature." 39
The withering barrage which has recently been turned upon the
anti-trust law 40 has included many suggestions for repeal or modi-
fication which are relevant to the bituminous industry. On one hand,
it is urged that the law by banning important cooperative action
among producers stands in the way of the recovery of business
and should be repealed either in toto or in its application to particular
fields.41  Repeal or unqualified exemption of chosen industries from
the operation of the act is also urged by those who believe this to be
the only course by which the government, in assuming drastic regulatory
powers over the basic industries will alleviate the maladjustment fostered
by a purely negative policy of regulation.42 In attempting to take a median
path between these alternatives, the vast majority of proposals evade funda-
mental issues.43 Solution of the pressing problems presented by the present
37.- See Hamilton, Anti-Trust Laws and Social Control of Business in
HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 5, and Hamilton, The Problem of Trust Reform
(1932) 32 COL. L. Ra-. 173.
38. Trenton Potteries Co. v. United States, supra note 5.
39. Brandeis, dissenting in Duplex v. Deering, 278 U. S. 1 (1918).
40. For an interesting symposium of current theory, see collection of essays,
The Anti-Trust Laws of the United States (1930) 147 ANNALS.
41. Gandy, op. cit. supra, note 17; Bockus, op. cit. supra note 19; Hervey,
op. cit. supra, note 31; Butler, Needed Changes in the Anti-Trust Laws (1930)
147 ANNALS 189, 191.
42. See Watkins, The Federal Trade Commission (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rav. 286;
Oliphant, supra note 5; Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Fear of Bureau-
cracy (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 513.
43. Note (1931) 45 Hnv. L. REv. 566, citing bills and resolutions intro-
duced during the 71st Congress, all of which died in Committee.
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state of the law is hardly advanced by assurances that merely minor
modification or clarification of the law will resolve all difficulties, and that
no more is required than to confer certainty of immunity from prosecution
upon arrangements for the innocent circulation of information or upon
understandings on purely nominal matters among rivals.44 The dif-
ficulty is not the uncertainty of the law, but the certainty that it now
obstructs a particularly vital class of trade arrangements.45 Variations
of the proposal that the Sherman Act be amended to read "reasonable
restraints of interstate commerce" -4 also leave the problem severely
untouched, because of the Court's inveterate habit of assimilating
ambiguous changes in the anti-trust law to previous standards of legality,47
and the complete conceptual emptiness of the suggested modification itself.
Production and price must become the objects of rational control if the
disorder which attends undirected competition in the bituminous field is
to be remedied. The industry must therefore be relieved of the operation
of the Sherman Act. But the vesting of business interests with arbitrary
power is not the only alternative. A substitute scheme specifically adapted
to the problems of bituminous mining must be devised through the medium
of a federal regulatory commission or a system of control within the in-
dustry, which will insure an adequate return to investors, operators and
labor, without withdrawing protection from consumers. 48 The holding in
Appalachian Coals, Ine. v. United States amounts to a withdrawal of the
court as an influential factor in the determination of the future organiza-
tion of the field of bituminous coal. It is believed that this decision will
hasten the rehabilitation of the industry, since the problem must now be
raised before the proper tribunal and in a form in which it can be satis-
factorily solved.
]A-UI1=ICIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TORTS OF POLICEMN
A RECENT New York case' awakens renewed surprise at the frequent
failure of the courts to keep pace with modern thought, and at their refusal
to permit the legislatures to change the common law, notwithstanding the
44. Podell, Our Anti-Trust Laws and the Eeowmic Situation (1931) 17
A. B. A. J. 254, 256; Donovan, The Need for a Commerce Court (1930) 147
ANNALS 138.
45. M OTAGUE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 29. HALMWoN, op. cit. supra
note 37, at 178.
46. See Jaffe and Torbriner, The Legality of Price-Fixing Agreements
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1164; MONTAGUE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 45 et seq.,
citing several changes on this theme.
47. MoNTAGUE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 43, citing cases and statutes.
48. For an analysis and criticism of the possible modes of organizing the
bituminous industry with a suggested system of internal order, see HEAimT0u,
A WAY op ORDER Fop BrrunNous CoAL (1928).
1. Inez Evans v. Charles W. Berry, Comptroller of the City of New York,
New York Law Journal, v. 88, No. 29, Aug! 4, 1932.
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demands of public opinion. Realizing the growing injustice of the ancient
rule that the innocent bystander, shot by stray bullets from policemen
pursuing criminals or making arrests, must, in practical effect, alone bear
his loss, the Municipal Assembly of New York City enacted in 1927 an
ordinance 2 providing that the Board of Estimate is authorized to make
an award of damages to such innocent bystanders when injured by police-
men. Inez Evans was standing near the scene of a holdup in February,
1927, and was shot by a stray bullet from the gun of a policeman engaged
in pursuing the highwaymen. She was incapacitated for about four years,
and, in the light of her lost earnings and expenses, received from the Board
of Estimate an award of $6,740. The Comptroller of New York declined
to pay the award without a judicial declaration of its legality; whereupon
Miss Evans sued out a writ of mandamus. Granted by Justice McGeehan
in the Special Term, the order was reversed by the Appellate Division,
First Department, on the ground that the assumption of liability for the
injury inflicted by the police officer represented no moral or equitable obli-
gation of the City, but, on the contrary, constituted a pure gift to a private
person, prohibited by the Constitution of the State of New York.8
The issue is clear-cut. Is there any moral or equitable element in the
assumption by the community of such liability? And is the legislature
or the court the proper judge of that question? Accepting the guide of
experience, perhaps our only criterion in determining whether a legisla-
tive admission of liability has any equitable or moral foundation, the
answer seems hardly doubtful, especially so in the State of New York,
where great advances have been made in recognizing community liability
for the torts of officers.
The courts have wisely come to the conclusion that if the legislature
might reasonably have considered an obligation to constitute an obliga-
tion of honor or justice or equity, a court should not undertake to over-
rule the legislative determination by holding an appropriation of money
to be an unfounded gift.4 In other words, the court would have to con-
2. LocAL LAw 13 (1927). "Section 1. The Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment is hereby authorized and empowered, in its discretion, to make an award
to a person who has been or hereafter shall be injured by a police officer while
such officer is engaged in arresting any person or in retaking any person who has
escaped from legal custody or in executing any legal process. Such award
shall be of such amount as the Board of Estimate and Apportionment shall
deem just and equitable."
3. Article 8, § 10. "No county, city, town or village shall hereafter give
any money or property, or loan its money or credit to or in aid of any in-
dividual, association or corporation, or become directly or indirectly the owner
of stock in, or bonds of, any association or corporation; nor shall any such
county, city, town or village be allowed to incur any indebtedness except for
county, city, town or village purposes . . 2"
4. "It would seem to be pretty unreasonable to assume that the legislature
conferred upon the courts power to pass upon and give judgment for claims
unless it itself had considered and approved their equitable nature." Williams-
burgh Savings Bank v. State, 243 N. Y. 231, 242, 153 N. E. 58, 61 (1926).
See'also Farrington v. State, 248 N. Y. 112, 115, 161 N. E. 438, 440 (1928).
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clude that a legislature in assuming a certain obligation acted without
precedent, policy, experience, or reasonable judgment, before they would
be justified in holding the assumption of liability an unfounded and un-
sustainable gift.
There has been a progressive development in New York State recog-
nizing the liability of the state to private citizens for injuries arising out
of the torts or misfeasance of state officers. The courts were slow to
espouse this development. For even after the enactment in 1919 of the
section of the Court of Claims Act waiving the state's immunity before
the Court of Claims in tort cases,5 the Court of Appeals held in Smith.
v. State 6 that the state had waived its immunity from suit but not from
liability for the torts of its employees, a decision which rendered the statute
nugatory and which was adversely commented upon by several law jour-
nals.7 But Judge McLaughlin for the Court of Appeals clearly indicated
that, of course, the legislature could waive its immunity from liability.
This was done in the broadest form by chapter 467 of the Laws of 1929,8
admitting for all types of official wrongdoing causing private injury the
liability which in particular instances had theretofore been assumed by
other special statutes.9 The Laws of 1929 made "every city, town, and
village .... liable for the negligence" of one of its officers or employees
operating "a municipally owned vehicle upon the public streets and high-
ways of the municipality" if operated "within the scope of his employ-
ment." 10 Two cases have already been decided under this law holding
the city liable for the negligence of officers acting in what is usually called
a governmental function.11 It seems reasonable to assume that an obliga-
5. COURT OF CLAiuis AcT (1919) § 12, N. Y. CODE CIV. Pnoc. § 2M4. "The
Court of Claims . . . has jurisdiction to hear and determine a private claim
against the state. . . . In no case shall any liability be implied against the
state and no award shall be made on any claim against the state except upon
such legal evidence as would establish liability against an individual or cor-
poration in a court of law or equity."
6. 227 N. Y. 405, 125 N. E. 841 (1920).
7. (1919) 5 CORN. L. Q. 78 and 340; (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 359, at 361;
(1924) 34 YAim L. J. 10-11.
8. 'The state hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of its
officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such torts de-
termined in accordance with the same rules of law and equity as apply to
an action in the supreme court against an individual or a corporation, and the
state hereby assumes liability for such acts . . . caused by the misfeasance
or negligence of the officers or employees of the state while acting as such
officer or employee."
9. See e.g., CANAL LAW, § 47; HIGHwAY LAW, § 176.
10. N. Y. LAws (1929) c. 466, § 282-g. The section proceeds: "Every
such appointee shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed an employee
of the municipality, notwithstanding the vehicle was being operated in the
discharge of a public duty for the benefit of all citizens of the community and
the municipality derived no special benefit in its corporate capacity."
11. Miller v. City of New York, 257 N. Y. Supp. 33 (2d Dep't 1932); Snyder
v. City of Binghamton, 138 Misc. 259, 261, 245 N. Y. Supp. 497, 500 (1930).
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tion recognized as moral and equitable by the state legislature has a like
moral and equitable character when recognized by a municipal legislature.
The Court of Appeals of New York has also recognized that community
liability for such injuries represents a moral and equitable obligation. 12
Both in People v. Westchester County National Bank and in Farrington
v. State the Court of Appeals has held that a moral obligation upon the
state arises not only out of benefits which the state has received, but out
of "injuries which have been suffered in its service or because of its acts
or acts done under its authority or because of the acts of its servants;" 13
that is, in respect of "claims involving injuries and damages wrongfully
inflicted upon individuals by those in the state service or others for whose
acts the state might justly be regarded as responsible." 14
New York in fact has gone beyond the assumption of liability for neg-
ligence merely, but has assumed liability where the operation of a public
service regardless of fault resulted in injury to an innocent individual. 10
In the Evans case it cannot be doubted that, had the policeman been em-
ployed by a private corporation or individual, the employer would have
been held liable. All that the City of New York did by the ordinance of
1927 was to waive its immunity from suit and liability and place itself
in the position of a private employer. The refusal of the legislature to
indemnify officers defending themselves against criminal or other charges 10
has no relevancy to the question under examination.
An overwhelming opinion throughout the world in favor of the assump-
tion of community liability for the torts of public officers may be regarded
as representing a growing moral conviction 17 to which the courts should
12. "Fortunately, and creditably to them, our courts have firmly established
the proposition that the state as well as an individual may be honorable and
may voluntarily recognize just obligations which it fairly and honestly ought
to pay even though they do not constitute purely legal claims such as in the
case of an individual could be enforced under the compulsion of judgment and
execution." Williamsburgh Savings Bank v. State, supra note 4, at 240, 153
N. E. at 61.
13. People v. Westchester County National Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 478, 132
N. E. 241, 246 (1921).
14. Farrington v. State, supra note 4, at 116, 161 N. E. at 440. Similar
explanations for the reasonableness of the assumption of state responsibility
are given by Judge Crane in Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208, 215, 119 N. E.
444, 445 (1918). See also Babcock v. State, 190 App. Div. 147, 180 N. Y. Supp.
3 (3d Dep't 1919), aff'd, 231 N. Y. 560, 132 N. E. 888 (1921).
15. See Judge Cardozo in People v. Westchester County National Bank,
supra note 13, at 486, 132 N. E. at 248, citing Munro v. State and Babcock v.
State, both supra note 14; and 16 CORN. L. Q. 359, at 361.
16. Matter of Chapman v. City of New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 61 N. E. 108
(1901); Cuvillier v. State, 250 N. Y. 285, 165 N. E. 284 (1929); Rosalsky v.
State, 254 N. Y. 117, 172 N. E. 261 (1930); Matter of Jensen, 44 App. Div.
509, 60 N. Y. Supp. 933 (2d Dep't 1899); Matter of Kilroe v. Craig, 238 N. Y.
628, 144 N. E. 920 (1924), aff'g 208 App. Div. 93, 203 N. Y. Supp. 71 (1st
Dep't 1924).
17. Aks, Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability (1929) 14 CORN. L. Q.
355; Albertsworth, New Interests in the Law of Torts (1922) 10 CALIp. L. Ruv.
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not remain impervious. At least when the legislative body takes account
of that conviction and assumes such liability, a court is hardly justified
in saying that it had no moral or equitable support. The New York Court
of Appeals has recognized that "the modern tendency is against the rule
of nonliability," 18 a tendency which has been translated into statute by
an increasing number of states.19 Prussia in 1909 and Germany in 1910
enacted statutes assuming such liability, even in the exercise of so-called
governmental functions.20 France long ago espoused and helped to develop
the modern tendency, transcending the strict requirement of tort or neg-
ligence, and demanding only evidence of a defective operation of the public
461, at 480; Angell, Sovereign Immunity-The Modern Trend (1925) 35 YALr
L. J. 150; Barnett, The Distinction betwccn Public and Private Functions in
Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations in Oregon (1932) 11 Om. L. Rm.
123; Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong (1925) 11 VA. L. REV. 349; Borebard,
Government Liability in Tort (1924-1925) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, (1926-
1927) 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039, (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 577, 734; Carraway,
Actions against the Commonwealth for Torts (1904) 1 CoM. L. REV. 241; Davie,
Suing the State (1884) 18 AM. L. REv. 814; 4 DILLON, MUNICIPAL, CORPORA-
TIONS (5th ed. 1911) c. 32; Doddridge, Distinction Between Governmental and
Proprietary Functions of Municipal Corporations (1925) 23 Micn. L. REV. 325;
Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types
of Tort Cases (1930) 78 U. of PA. L. REv. 315; Fleischmann, The Dishonesty
of Sovereignties (1910) 33 Report of the N. Y. Bar Ass'n 229; Freund, Private
Claims against the State (1893) 8 PoL. Sci. Q. 625; Glushein and Xatzin,
Administrative Law, etc. (1931) 16 CoRN. L. Q. 359; GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL
Holm RuLE (1895) c. 7; Gordon, The Crown as Litigant (1929) 45 L. Q. REv.
186; Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations (1921) 4 ILL. L. Q. 28;
JoNEs, NEGLIGENCE or5 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1892); Lasld, The Reapon-
sibility of the State in England (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 447; MacDonald,
Substantive Liability of the State of New York (1929) 1 N. Y. State Bar
Ass'n Bull. 235, 238; Maguire, State Liability for Tort (1916) 30 HAnv. L.
REv. 20; Maitland, The Crown as a Corporation (1901) 17 L. Q. REV. 131,
at 142; Martindale, The State and Its Creditors (1887) 7 So. L. REV. (N. S.)
544; 6 MXcQUILN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) c. 53; Moore,
Liability for Acts of Public Servants (1907) 23 L. Q. REv. 23; Rccel, Govern-
-mental Function of Municipality-Liability for Tort (1919) 89 CENT. L. J. 27;
2 SHEARMAN AND REDFnED, NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) c. 12; Tennant, Servants
of the Crown (1932) 10 CAN. BAR REV. 155; Tooke, Public Authoritics and
Legal Liability (1926) 20 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 898; Ward, Municipal Liability
(1930) 2 N. Y. State Bar Ass'n Bull. 402; WHITE, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (1920); WILIS, MUNICIPAL LIIrry FOR TORT (1901).
18. Augustine v. The Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
19. CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 1714 1/2, at 661, STAT. (1931) at 168;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) C. 319, §§ 5988, 5989, at 1869; MICH. PUB. ACTS (1929)
No. 259, at 621; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1931) c. 9, §§ 1920-1, 1920-2, at 110;
Wis. STAT. (1931) 66.095, at 792.
20. Dehne, Ernst. Die Haftung des Staates fdr seine Beamten (Freien-
walde, 1912); Holtz, Carl F. Die Haftung des Staates fflr seine Beamten
(Greifswald, 1914); Pillmann, Carl. Die Haftung des Staates fur seine Beam-
ten (Erlangen, 1928).
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service inflicting injury.21 In a recent French case, the state was held
liable for injuries inflicted on innocent bystanders by an insane person
who by negligent police supervision had been permitted to escape from
a state asylum. 22 South Africa exhibits numerous instances of liability
for injuries inflicted by policemen in the discharge of public duties.23 The
pending English Crown Proceedings bill assumes liability of the Crown
"for any wrongful act done, or any neglect or default commited, by an
officer of the Crown in the same manner and to the same extent as that
in and to which a principal, being a private person, is liable for any wrong-
ful act done, or any neglect or default committed, by his agent." 24 And in
the pending Federal Tort Claims bill the United States assumes liability
for any injuries caused by the "negligence or wrongful act or omission of
any officer or employee of the government within the scope of his office
or employment." 25 It is a fact that the British Treasury now frequently
defends officers against whom suits in tort may have been brought and
pays the judgment found, if it is believed that the officer acted with
reasonable prudence. It has not been suggested that there is anything im-
moral or inequitable or unjust in such assumption of liability.
The late Attorney General of New York, Mr. Hamilton Ward, in 1930
caused a bill to be introduced in the legislature providing that "no munici-
pal corporation shall hereafter be exempted from liability for damage
because the activity in which it or its officers or employees are engaged
is of a public or governmental nature." He made a strong argument in
its support before the New York State Bar Association. 20
It is not without interest in this connection to observe that international
tribunals have taken it for granted, as a general principle of law, applied
in appropriate cases in international courts, that a state is liable for the
uncorrected injuries inflicted upon alieIis through the mistaken, negligent,
or maladroit action of soldiers and policemen in shooting people who were
privileged from assault.2 7  Very recently the International Congress of
Comparative Law adopted a resolution in support of such liability.
21. Tomaso Greco, Council of State, Feb. 10, 1905, Dalloz P6r. 1906, 3. 81;
Auxerre, Council of State, Feb. 17, 1905, Dalloz Pr. 1906, 3. 81; Pluchard,
Council of State, Dec. 24, 1909, Le Bon, 1029; DUGUIT, LAW IN rHE MODERN
STATE (1919) 225 et seq.; WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT (1927)
149 et seq.
22. Garcin v. France, Council of State, Jan. 23, 1931, Revue du Droit Public,
vol. 48, p. 571.
23. See the article signed C. J. G., The State and Its Liability for the Torts
of Policemen (1932) 49 SOUTH AFRIcAN L. J .4.
24. Gordon, J. W. The Crown as Litigant (1929) 45 L. Q. REV. 186; Inskip,
Sir Thomas. Proceedings By and Against the Crown (1931) 4 CAMB. L. J. 1;
Keith, Berriedale. Claims By and Against the Crown (1928) 10 J. Soo. CoMP.
LEG. 186.
25. See Borchard, Tort Liability of the State (1930) 12 J. Soc. COMp. LEG. 1.
26. Municipal Liability, address published in (1930) 2 N. Y. State Bar
Ass'n Bull. 402.
27. Portuondo (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, Moore's Arb. III. 3007;
Youmans (U. S.) v. Mexico, Sept. 8, 1923, Opinions of the Commission, 1927,
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There is thus a widespread conviction that such liability is almost
elementary to civilized government. The climate of opinion has changed
since the lower New York courts decided Moilnow v. Raftcr and Bronm
v. State,29 denying municipal liability for the torts of officers. This is
evidenced by the numerous statutes which have been enacted in several
states, notably in New York, and by the approval of community liability
by the New York and other courts. In several states such assumption of
liability has been e.xpressly held not to constitute a gift, inhibited by the
state constitution.30 And whatever the legal theory on which such as-
sumption of liability may be based,3 ' the fact is inescapable that it repre-
sents a growing conviction of civilized people. That conviction the people
of New York have evidently shared. This evidence should be sufficient
to satisfy any court, if a court assumes the power to express its own opinion
on the subject, that the legislative assumption of liability had a decided
moral and equitable foundation. That which is regarded by much of the
rest of the world as a legal obligation may surely be accepted by an
American legislature as at least a moral obligation. If an independent
New York theory is desired, it may be found in the course of the opinion
delivered by Judge Cardozo in People v. Westchestcr Co.zty Natioal
Bank: 32
"The legislature might readjust the incidence of the burden, might establish a
more equitable distribution between the individual and the public, through the
voluntary acceptance of liability for a loss which was without a remedy when
suffered. . .. The readjustment of these burdens along the lines of equality
and equity is a legitimate function of the state as long as justice to its citizens
remains its chief concern (Oswego & Syracu.sc R. R. Co. v. State of l Y., 220
N. Y. 351)." E. MI. B.
p. 150; Falcon (Mexdco) v. U. S., id. at 140; Garcia and Garza (Me.dco) v.
U. S., id. at 163; Kling (U. S.) v. Mexico, Sept. 8, 1923, Opinions of the
Commission, Oct. 1930 to July, 1931, at 36, and the many cases there discussed
at 41 et seq.
28. 89 Misc. 495, 152 N. Y. Supp. 110 (1915).
29. 206 App. Div. 634 (3d Dep't 1923).
30. Heron v. Riley, 284 Pac. 209 (Cal. 1930); id. 209 Cal. 507, 289 Pac. 10
(1930); Pennington's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky 527, 46 S. W. (2d)
1079 (1932); State ex rel. Crowe v. City of St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125, 73 S. W.
623 (1903); Mills v. Stewart, Sec. of State, 76 Mont. 429, 247 Pac. 332 (192);
Ouzts v. State Highway Dept., 161 S. C. 21, 159 S. E. 457 (1931). See also
City of Anniston v. Hillman, 220 Ala. 505, 126 So. 169 (1930); see Note (1930)
4 CiN. L. REv. 491; The State, Bradley, Prosecutor, v. The Council of the Town
of Hammonton, 38 N. J. Law 430 (1876); ef. Candill v. Pinsion, 24 S. W. (2d)
938 (Ky. 1930).
31. See discussion of the theories in Borchard, Theories of Govcrnmcntal
Responsibility in Tort (1928) 28 Cot. L. REv. 577, 734.
32. Supra note 13, at 489, 132 N. E. at 249. It is immaterial that this
theory was expressed in a dissenting opinion on the constitutionality of the
soldiers' bonus.
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THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION'S OPINION UPON
THE MITCHELL DATM CONSTRUCTION COSTS
II
Power-site Valuation
BY far the greater portion of the Federal Power Commission's opinion in
the Mitchell Dam case 1 is devoted to a consideration of the proper valu-
ation of lands and certain related intangibles which had been acquired
by the Alabama Power Company prior to the passage of the Federal Water
Power Act and the licensing of the Company thereunder. Several groups,
each possessing one or more dam sites and holding easements for power
purposes, were originally interested in developing the power possibilities
of the Coosa River.2 Of these groups the most important was the original
Alabama Power Company which owned Lock 12 and Lock 14.3 This situa-
tion prevailed until outside interests, organized under the name of Alabama
Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd., introduced a unified control.
During the years 1912 and 1913 this corporation acquired the outstanding
stock of four of the various groups along the River, together with that
of another organization interested in developments on other streams, and
purchased outright from the remaining group the dam-site lands which
the latter held at Duncan's Riffle.4 This last purchase was made in the
name of the original Alabama Power Company and the lands were im-
mediately transferred to that group.5 Subsequently, the Traction Company
caused its five controlled companies to become integrated into one cor-
poration, known as the new Alabama Power Company.
This fusion was effected by an exchange of stock, the ratio of exchange
in each case being determined by a valuation of the properties of the
respective companies. In payment for those of the old Alabama Power
Company, which included altogether Lock 12, Lock 14 and Duncan's Riffle
with an aggregate valuation of $7,000,000, 70,000 shares of par value stock
were issued.6 As the plans for projects on the Coosa River were finally
drawn, the Mitchell development was made to include the lands at both
Lock 14 and Duncan's Riffle, the latter being the actual site of the dam
proper. The value of these properties and those at Lock 12 being re-
1. A discussion of other factors involved in the recent determination by
the Federal Power Commission in the Mitchell Dam case appeared in the
November issue of the Yale Law Journal. (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 66.
2. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 16-17, 37-38.
3. With the exception, to be noted more in detail hereafter, of one parcel
of land at Lock 14, held by one of the other organizations.
4. Opinion, at 6.
5. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 17. This appears to have been
the method of financing purchases on the part of the Alabama Power Company
in the first years after its acquisition by the Traction interests. Federal Trade
Commission, Utility Corporations (1931) 70th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. Doe. 92, Pt.
30, at 25.
6. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 20.
garded as equal, the total of $7,000,000 was allocated equally between LocL-
12 and Mitchell Dam; the present Alabama Power Company thus claims
as the cost to it of properties utilized in the project now under considera-
tion, the sum of $3,500,000.7 In so calculating its claim, licensee appears
to omit all consideration of the one parcel of land at Lock 14, known as
parcel 214, which, alone of all the lands embraced in the scheme, the original
Alabama Power Company did not hold at the time of the integration of
the various groups in 1913.8
Implicit in this claim for $3,500,000 are three assertions. One is that
1913 denotes the date of acquisition by licensee of the assets above de-
scribed. This view is based upon the contention that a new Alabama
Power Company was formed on the fusion of the five development com-
panies in that year. That fusion was effected under Alabama law 0 which
appears to have made it optional whether there should be a continuance of
the existence of one of the corporations involved or a totally new corporate
entity initiated.'0 The Commission so interpreted the statute, and found
in the articles of agreement adopted by the constituent companies a clear
election not to create a new corporation but to perpetuate the old Alabama
Power Company.11 On the basis of these facts, in the exercise of its
duty under the Power Act to determine costs as of the date of acquisition
by a licensee, the Commission rejected this contention.
While the Commission's interpretation of the statute seems the logical
one, the Alabama Supreme Court has apparently construed it as giving
rise to a new corporation in every case of either merger or consolidation,
12
and the decision of a neighboring state supreme court has placed a like
interpretation upon a statute couched in very similar terms.13 But whether
the law did or did not actually allow, of an option of technical merger or
consolidation, the situation serves to indicate the unsatisfactoriness of
such a statutory test for determining the true date of acquisition, an
inadequacy which is quite as apparent in the one case as in the other.
For it would appear to be highly undesirable that important decisions in
valuations under the Act should necessarily be governed by exercises of
options motivated by totally irrelevant considerations. 14 Rather, it would
7. Id. at 21.
8. See Opinion, at 10.
9. 2 ALA. CODE (1907) §§ 3502-3508. The Alabama law is the same at the
present time. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §§ 7037-7044.
10. See, especially, § 3502.
11. The relevant portions of the agreement ratified by the directors of the
five constituent companies are cited in the Opinion, p. 7.
12. Jackson v. Ariton Banking Co., 214 Ala. 483, 108 So. 359 (1926). From
this case licensee argues that a new corporation was formed in 1913. Brief of
Alabama Power Company, at 46. But cf., as tending to support the position
of the Commission, Alabama, T. & N. Ry. v. Tolman, 200 Ala. 449, 76 So. 381
(1917).
13. Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N. C. 524, 152 S. E. 489 (1930).
The statute is now N. C. CODE ANN. (Mlichie, 1931) §§ 1224a-1224f.
14. There is some indication that the Commission senses this. See Opinion,
at 9. The discussion here, as throughout the comment, is directed primarily
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seem that inquiry should be directed in each case to the actual nature of
the resulting change. Thus if the fusion marked changes in the managing
interests, substitution of new policies, and the acquisition by the older
organization of significant properties from the other groups involved,
there would be strong evidence of the creation of a factually new corpora-
tion. Whereas, if there were no such variations in control and policies,
if the assets acquired were largely those of the original company, and there
was apparent a general continuity in factual existence, then the evidence
would be persuasive that no new entity resulted. On the basis of such a
test, the ruling of the Commission was clearly justified, for practically
all the assets going into the Mitchell Dam project belonged to the old
Alabama Power Company, 15 and the history of the enterprise reveals a
high degree of continuity of interest and activity from the time that the
power possibilities in Alabama first engaged the attention of the Traction
interests. 10 It might have been better policy to have predicated that ruling
upon such a basis rather than upon the one adopted. 17
A second assertion arising from licensee's claim is that in the absence
of any intimation of fraud,' 8 the valuation on which was predicated the
issue of $3,500,000 par value stock is conclusive upon the Commission in
the present determination. This is urged from the fact that at the time
of this valuation the constitution of the State of Alabama contained a
provision 19 that no corporation should issue stock or bonds except for
money, labor done or property actually received. The interpretation placed
upon this provision by the highest state court had been that the judgment
of a corporation's directors as to the value of services and property should
be conclusive in the absence of fraud. 20  Similar construction 21 placed
toward a consideration of the problems raised by the necessity of pursuing
valuations into the years prior to the adoption of the Act and the initiation
of present policies thereunder. Note will be taken, on the other hand, of the
bearing of the discussion on valuation problems likely to arise with respect to
projects wholly conceived and constructed after the passage of the Act. Here
it may be noted that advantage might easily be taken in the future of such a
statutory test as that employed by the Commission with the result that every
fusion would be executed as an outright consolidation resulting in the formation
of a new corporation. Such fusions may not of course be as numerous in
future project developments as in the earlier history of the hydro-electric
industry.
15. See p. 248, supra.
16. See the testimony before the Federal Trade Commission during its
investigation into the Alabama Power Company, to the effect that in the
"merger" of 1913 "the continuity of the original Alabama Power Co ...
was preserved." Federal Trade Commission, supr, note 5, at 53.
17. On the basis of the method of valuation adopted by the Commission,
which is discussed infra, this difference as to the correct date of acquisition
involved a sum of approximately $190,000. See Reply Brief for the Commis-
sioni at 28-29.
18. See Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 18-20, 24.
19. A" CONST. (1901) § 234.
20. Elyton Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator Co., 92 Ala.
407, 9 So. 129 (1891); Roman v. Dimmick, 115 Ala. 233, 22 So. 109 (1897);
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upon provisions like that of Alabama, which are to be found in most of
the states,22 has given rise to the so-called good faith rule.23 This doctrine
clearly pertains, however, to the protection of creditors and stockholders
against stock watering in businesses having limited liability. It appeared
with the principle of limitation of liability 2 4 and the conclusive presumption
of the good faith rule is in conformity with that principle. That these
provisions and rules have this single application is generally recognized
in the cases 25 and nowhere more emphatically than in the decision of the
Alabama court most relied upon by licensee.2 0  Indeed, but few attempts
have been made to carry over the conclusive presumption of the correctness
of directors' valuations into the domain of utility regulation. Where at-
tempted, the result has been similar to that in the instant case where the
Power Commission observed that such provisions "are intended for the
protection of creditors and injured stockholders" and "are not binding
upon the Government in the exercise of powers conferred by federal
statute." 27
The Commission's position is strengthened by further considerations.
Thus the agreement for the exchange of stock and for the valuation of the
properties was between companies under common control, and by a recent
pronouncement of the Supreme Courts2 8 this fact of community of interest
seems to entitle commissions to attach little significance to any kind of
price agreement made under such circumstances. While relying upon this
decision, the Commission might also have pointed out that even under the
good faith rule courts are influenced by evidence of self-interest on the part
of those making the appraisement.2 9 But undoubtedly more significant is
Lea v. Iron Belt Mercantile Co., 119 Ala. 271, 24 So. 28 (1898); Lea v. Iron
Belt Mercantile Co., 147 Ala. 421, 42 So. 415 (1906).
21. DODD, STOCK WATERING (1930) 57.
22. (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 893.
23. Cf. Ballantine, Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota (1923) 7 M xx.
L. REV. 79, 93; Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par Value (1924)
24 COL. L. REv. 449, 453. In some states the conclusiveness, in the absence of
fraud, of the directors' valuation is fixed by statute. Bonbright, Shareholders'
Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on Watcrcd Stock (1925) 25 COL. L.
REv. 408, 415.
24. DODD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 30.
25. See the cases cited in DODD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 15-17; DOUGLAS
AN SHANCS, CASES AND MATERALS ON BusINEss UNrs--FINANC (1931)
617-622, 633-637.
26. Elyton Land Co. v. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator Co., upra
note 20. The Commission notes this. Opinion, at 11.
27. Opinion, at 11. The only other recent attempt that has been found is
one before the New York Public Service Commission, State Division, in a case
involving a petition by a utility for permission to issue stock for certain property
it desired to acquire. Re Niagara Hudson Power Corp., P. U. R. 1932C, 486,
492 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932).
28. Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 285 U. S. 119
(1932).
29. See DODD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 95-96, and cases there cited.
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the fact that, where regulation of security issues is not present, excessive
capitalization has been, and continues to be, common in the United States.80
Especially is this true with respect to all types of fusion and combination
in the utility field. Prior to the establishment in some of the states of
governmental control over public utility securities, inflation of capitalization
was often perpetrated under such circumstances 31 and the consensus of
opinion is that there continue to exist many instances of uncontrolled ex-
cessive payments in stock purchases, mergers and consolidations, followed
by overcapitalization.32 The investigations of the Federal Trade Com-
mission have revealed situations strikingly similar to that presented in the
instant case, where mergers dictated by dominant parent companies have
involved payments greatly in excess of the actual value of the assets
acquired; 33 indeed, the fact appears that this was true of the 1913 cor-
porate change under consideration by the Commission. It seems that upon
the effecting of the so-called consolidation, the fixed capital of the resulting
company was placed at approximately $13,475,000.34 Of this sum $9,900,000
constituted assets unrecorded on the books of the constituent companies., -
Approximately $7,000,000 of this write-up related to property acquired
from the old Alabama Power Company,3 6 $3,500,000 being credited directly
to the Mitchell Dam development.3 7 This amount was sought to be justi-
fied on the ground that it represented a proper reimbursement of those
who, while organized under that name with only a nominal corporate
capitalization, had as individuals incurred heavy expenditures in pro-
moting the Mitchell Dam and other projects.38 It was, in short, to cover
"those expenditures made, services rendered, and other equities" not there-
tofore expressed upon the books or in the capital structure of the original
Alabama Company.3o But while there appears to be merit in some of this
claim to unrecorded expenditures, the full amount, to the extent of which
30. BISHOP, THE FINANCING OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1929) 153.
31. Heilman, The Capitalization of Public Utility Consolidations (1917)
7 Am. ECON. RLv. 187; Waltersdorf, State Control of Utility Capitalization
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 337, 344.
32. Federal Trade Commission, Utility Corporations (1928--) 70th Cong.,
1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 92; MASSACHUSETTS: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COrMMISSION
ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1930) 33-34; Raushen-
bush, The Concentration of Control in Power (1927) 129 ANN. Am. ACAD. 118,
121-122; Re Midwest Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1930B, 284, 287 (Mo. P. S. C. 1930);
cf. NEw YORK STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSIONS LAW (1930) VOL. III, Hearings 2445.
33. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 32, Pt. 22, at 182-189 (1930);
id., Pts. 23 and 24, at 305-312 (1930).
34. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 5, at 28-30.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Ibid.
37. Id. at 30. It is significant to note that this amount exactly measures
the licensee's claim in the present determination.
38. Id. at 106-110.
39. Id. at 36. These contentions were developed by the present Alabama
Power Company in a document filed with the Alabama Public Service Com-
[Vol. 4,2
stock was issued in payment, cannot be defended as representing undiluted
value to the acquiring corporation.
Yet another assertion is inherent in licensee's position on the claimed
item of $3,500,000. It is that a valuation made for purposes of security
issue and one made for the determination of the cost of property acquired
are comparable. The determination of value has, however, long been recog-
nized as varying with the purpose of valuation.40 In the absence of
security regulation, the standard of valuation for purposes of security
issue is the economic value of the given property to its corporate owner;
what is sought in cost valuation is a measurement of the financial sacri-
fice incurred by the owner in acquiring that property. Economic worth is
determined from capitalization of expected earnings; 42 cost is found from
known expenditures or imputed from market prices.42  This distinction
between discounted earning power and cost is generally appreciated 43 and
was very distinctly drawn by licensee itself.44 Yet it is clear that while
the Act requires adherence to investment cost in determinations made
thereunder, 45 the 1913 valuation was rested squarely upon a capitalization
of estimated earnings 46 and licensee now specifically lays claim to this
alleged economic value of the assets as assembled, in contradistinction to
the prices paid for them as separate elements:17
The Commission, clearly cognizant of this fact,4 8 was therefore correct
in the position which it took. Nor is such a position inconsistent with
that of the Interstate Commerce Commission, though licensee so urged.
That commission, it is true, has in several valuations completed railroad
investment accounts 4 through the use of par value of securities as a
mission and bearing the title "Memo in substantiation of $3,500,000 included
as cost applicable to Mitchell Dam project."
40. ComtOrNs, LEGAL FouNDATioNs op CAPITALisM (1924) 211; Bonbright,
The Problem of Judicial Valuation (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 493, 494, 521.
41. BisHoP, op. cit. supra note 30, at 156-157.
42. See COmMiONS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 202; DODD, op. cit. supra note 21,
at 98.
43. DODD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 98-108, 111; HAnTiAN, FUn VAUE (1920)
81, 82; LOUGH, BusiNEss FINANCE (1917) 173-175; Bonbright, szpra note 40,
at 522, note; Craven, Railroad Valuation: A Statcncuzt of the Problcm (1923)
9 A. B. A. J. 681, passim; Re United Fuel Gas Co., P. U. R. 1932B, 61, 79 (W.
Va. P. S. C. 1931).
44. Supplemental Brief for Licensee, at 3, 5-6.
45. 41 STAT. 1064 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 796 (1926).
46. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 1S-19, Reply Brief for Licensee,
at 24.
47. Supplemental Brief for Licensee, at 3.
48. "It [licensee's valuation] related to the earnings expected from the
development of these projects, not to the cost of assembling the lands, ma-
terials, and services necessary to their construction." Opinion, at 12.
49. "Actual legitimate original cost" is by the Power Act made equivalent
to the investment in road and equipment account of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. See 41 STAT. 1064 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 796 (192G). In these
accounts cost is measured by the cash outlay or, where the consideration given
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measure of cost.50 But it has done so only to a limited extent, to complete
parts of accounts not otherwise ascertainable, and then only for lack of
any other evidence.5 1 In the Mitchell Dam case, however, the valuation
was of the entire property and there existed other and more accurate evi-
dence of cost.52 Perhaps, on the other hand, the Power Commission in
its opinion did not adequately emphasize the significance of its ruling on
this matter. The essential point would seem to be that even though a
valuation made for purposes of security issue were shown to be proper
and not excessive, it could not be taken over in a cost determination under
the Federal Water Power Act. Indeed, this would be generally true even
if such valuation had been favorably tested in a stockholders' or creditors'
suit, for in such suits it appears that courts have usually adopted as their
standard of value "'value to the corporation for its purposes' rather than
value to anyone else, or market value in the strict sense of the price for
which the property could then have been sold." 53 The contention that a
directors' valuation for stock issue purposes is conclusive upon the Com-
mission is thus met not only with the answer that such a valuation applies
only to suits in instances of alleged stock watering and is factually destroyed
by evidence of prevailing over-valuations in utility finance, but also with
the fact that it is completely dissimilar from the cost valuation required
by the Act.
The foregoing discussion assumes the nonexistence of governmental
regulation of security issues, which was the situation in the present in-
stance. The question therefore becomes pertinent as to cases where the
opposite is true, for the Commission may well meet situations wherein
there are urged upon it valuations for purposes of security issue which
have been approved by some regulatory commission.5 4 There is no unanim-
is other than cash, by the money value of that consideration. "Thus whore stock
is the consideration, its market value is generally taken as the measure of
cost. See Re Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 24 I. C. C.
(Val. Rep.) 1, 8 (1929).
50. The instances cited by the Power Company are Re Bangor & Aroos-
took Rr. Co., 97 1. C. C. 153, 155-156 (1925); Re Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi-
cago & St. Louis Ry. Co.o supra note 49, at 4; Re Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
24 I. C. C. (Val. Rep.) 451, 459-461 (1929).
51. The policy of the Interstate Commerce Commission is best revealed in
Re Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., supra note 49, at 4, 0.
There the Commission relied upon par value of securities to a rather great
extent. But it did so "For lack of evidence, however, of the contemporary
cash value of these securities . . . ," noting too that because of this inability
to determine their cash value it could not be stated whether or not the amounts
taken "represent accurately the money equivalent expended for the property
covered by these investment accounts."
52. See the discussion at j'p 256, infra.
53. DODD, op. cit. supra note 21, at 269. See Clifiton Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Jamison, 256 Fed. 577, 582 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919).
54. Not all state utility commissions possess regulatory power over security
issues, however, even at the present time. Thus there are still many un-
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ity or consistency among commissions regarding the proper basis of
capitalization.5 5 In general, however, since the aim of regulation is to
have capitalization reflect the cost of the utility's assets, earning power is
seldom employed, while actual cost is most favored. 0 In the construction
of property, such cost is ascertained from the records of e.x-penditure;
where assets are purchased, evidence of cost is found in the value of those
assets.57 This value is determined from a consideration of the original
cost of the property, its duplication cost, its earning power, and other
relevant matters, with great weight given to exchange value. 5 A valua-
tion for purposes of issuing stock predicated upon such a basis would be
so close to a cost valuation under the Power Act as perhaps to warrant
its use, but because of the lack of uniformity in this field of regulation
the Commission would necessarily have to scrutinize closely any specific
valuation that was advanced before adopting it. The fact that a valuation
was under regulatory control would in itself have no significance. 2
Finally, independent of the above considerations, it seems apparent that
the position taken by the Power Company on the question of power-site
valuation is untenable. The appraisal it advances was based upon pro-
spective earning power, which was estimated from the then difference in
cost of producing power by water and by steam. Such a method of cal-
culating value, often urged upon state commissions with reference to the
valuation of water rights, has been almost uniformly rejected by them.o
Some of those commissions stress the fact that this method assumes a
regulated valuations to which the principles developed in the preceding dis-
cussion fully apply.
55. LAGERQUIST, PUBLIC UTIMrY FINANCE (1927) 129-153; LocKIN, REu-
LATION OF SECURITY ISSUES BY THE INTERSTATE Co=umcn CoMLusSIoN (1925)
54-63.
56. LAGERQUIST, op. cit. supra note 55, at 140, 142; LoCKLIN, op. cit. supra note
55, at 55.
57. Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Issuance of Securities by Public Seruico
Corporations (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 716, '734.
58. Id. at 734, 738-739.
59. The necessity for caution is strikingly revealed by the policy of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and that of the regulatory body in Massa-
chusetts. The former seeks to use its final rate-making values in passing upon
proposed stock issues by the carriers; as a result, a valuation for security
regulation may in one case approximate cost, in another reproduction cost,
and in a third something somewhere between. LocKLIN, op. cit. spra, note 55,
at 60. In Massachusetts, although the policy has supposedly been to control
capitalization so that it will tend to reflect what has been invested in public
utilities, it is said that there is no equivalence between the captalization of
a local utility and the actual total cost of its property, the latter being greater.
BARNES, PUBLIC UTILITY CONTEOL IN MASSACHUSETTS (1930) 128.
60. The important commission decisions up to recent years are collected
and fully discussed in 2 WHrrTEN-WILcox, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SEnVICE Co1-
PORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) 1214-1281. See also Tennessee Eastern Electric Co. v.
Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, P. U. R. 1928D, 722, 732 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. 1928).
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constant spread between the cost of the two alternatives of power produc-
tion, whereas in reality there obtains a continuous change in the relative
economy of the two, depending upon a number of variable factors.0 ' But
seemingly more significant, especially with respect to situations arising
under the Federal Water Power Act, is the fact pointed out by other
commissions that valuation by the comparative steam power method has
the effect of equating consumer prices for electrical energy to the cost
of the more expehsive mode of production. Such a result denies the public
the benefit to be derived from one of its great natural resources 02 and
defeats the very purpose of the Federal Act and similar state laws.03
As an alternative to the method of valuation proposed by the licensee,
the Commission adopted one predicated upon a combination of cost where
known, and cost imputed from market value, where the actual cost could
not be determined. Adhering to its conclusion that no new corporate
enterprise resulted from the fusion of 1913, the Commission evaluated as
of that date only the one parcel 214, which had previously been the property
of the Alabama Power & Electric Company.0 4 Its cost was imputed from
its then market value as measured by the allocated price paid for it, along
with other assets, in 1912 when the Traction Company acquired the various
companies along the Coosa River. 0 Of the other lands at the Lock 14
site, the actual prices paid by the old Alabama Power Company were found
from the deeds of conveyance in the majority of instances. Where the
deeds did not give the real consideration, cost was based upon an assumed
market value as calculated from prices paid for similar parcels. In the
case of the lands at Duncan's Riffle, the actual considerations were known.
There had also been calculated for the Commission the cost of Mitchell
Dam lands based upon the assumption that a new and separate corporation
had been formed in 1913. This cost, with respect to the Lock 14 lands,
including parcel 214, was imputed from a market value estimated upon the
basis of the apportioned price paid for these and other lands by the
Traction interests the previous year. 0
There can be no doubt of the correctness of the Commission's position
in its adoption of such a valuation technique. A cost valuation is plainly
61. 2 WHITTEN-WILCOX, 10C. cit. supra note 60; Tennessee Eastern Electric
Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, supra note 60. Chairman Smith
and Commissioner McNinch consider this point in their respective concurring
opinions. Opinion, at 31-32, and 47.
62. See the commission cases cited in 2 WHmTTEN-WILcoX, loc. cit. oupra
note 60, especially at 1248-1249.
63. See Du Puy, The Power Commission (1930) 6 PUB. UTIL. FoTNIGHTLY
77, 81; Re Lockport & Newfane Power & Water Supply Co., P. U. R. 1928B,
183, 192 (N. Y. P.' S. C. 1927). And see the well considered remarks of Chair-
man Smith in his concurring opinion. Opinion, at 33.
64. Opinion, at 10. And see page 248, supra.
65. See p. 252, supra. The ensuing outline of the Commission's cost calcu-
lations follows the general description of the properties there set out.
66. Reply Brief for the Commission, at 26. A detailed description of all
these cost determinations is given in the same brief, at 22-29.
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required by the provisions of the Power Act,67 and the methods employed
by the Commission in ascertaining the land costs are similar to those of
other regulatory bodies, which resort to such evidences of cost as company
vouchers, deeds, county and municipal records, tax assessments, court
records, and contemporary sale prices of similar parcels.6 s But although
the theory of valuation adopted by the Commission is sound, criticism may
be made of the apparent failure, in two respects, to render the determina-
tion sufficiently inclusive of all proper cost elements. It has been before
noted 69 that each of the original development companies on the Coosa
River had, by complying with certain provisions of the laws of Alabama,70
secured easements in the river for power purposes. It is assumed by the
Commission that the costs incurred in the perfection of these rights were
included in the price paid by the Traction Company for the various prop-
erties.71 Such an assumption is correct as to the right at Duncan's Riffle,
for the cost of that site to licensee is measured from the price paid for
it by the Traction interests; it is difficult to perceive, on the other hand,
how it can be true with respect to the easement at Lock 14, since the cost
of that site to licensee is determined almost entirely from other considera-
tions. By a narrow ruling, it could, of course, be held that the cost of ob-
taining the right at Lock 14 should not be included, 2 inasmuch as the
Mitchell Dam was constructed at Duncan's Riffle and under a later right
perfected in 1916, 73 but such a position would seem difficult of justifi-
cation.74
67. See p. 253, and note 45, supra.
68. Re Texas Midland Railroad, 75 I. C. C. 1, 164, 166 (1918) (records
of all types); 1 WHrrrEN-Wrcox, op. cit. supra note 60, at 606 (records, tax
assessments, and sale prices of similar land). The Federal Power Commission's
use, as evidence of cost, of prices paid for the same properties in exchanges
consummated within a short time previous to the transfers under considera-
tion is very like the use of contemporary sale prices of comparable property.
Where such data is available, it is held to be of significant weight. City of
Loogootee v. Loogootee Water Co., P. U. R. 1932C, 494, 497 (Ind. P. S. C. 1932).
It is to be noted, however, that the imputing of cost from market value makes
no allowance for the possibility that the utility was forced to pay more for land
than the going market price. While not of any importance in the immediate
case, owing to the manner here of ascertaining market value, this increased
cost has been found to be a real factor in the purchase of land by railroads
and of some magnitude in the case of other utilities. NAsiH, EcoNoMics OF
PUBLIC UTnrrEs (2d ed. 1931) 149. The Supreme Court, on the other hand,
refuses to give weight to this possibility. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352
(1913). The position of the Court has, however, been vigorously attached. FLoy,
VALUE FOR RATE-MAKING (1916) 76-77.
69. See p. 248, supra.
70. 2 ALA. CODE (1907) § 6148.
71. Opinion, at 18-19.
72. Cf. Re Union Electric Co., P. U. R. 1928E, 396, 403 (Mont. P. S. C. 1928)
(no allowance made for expense of securing certificate unnecessary for the
lawful operation of the utility).
73. Reply Brief for the Commission, at 34-35.
74. It is difficult to understand the extensive discussion between licensee
and Commission regarding the proper legal designation of these rights, since
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If a separate allowance were to be made for the cost to licensee of secur-
ing the easement at the old Lock 14 site, the amount would have to be
estimated, since it is unknown. Indeed, there are no records extant of
any of the early expenses of a promotional nature incurred either by the
old Alabama Power Company or by the Traction Company.15 But as
against the licensee's contention that notwithstanding, there should be an
allowance estimated for such expenditures because the cost to it of the
land alone "represents only a small fraction of the total costs which must
necessarily have been incurred," 76 the Commission took the position that
it would not go beyond the expense records and vouchers which could be
produced by the company."7 In this it followed closely the position main-
tained by the Interstate Commerce Commission which has consistently
refused, except within very narrow limits, to estimate the original cost
of rail carriers where such cost cannot be determined from existing
records. 78 But the interpretation placed by that commission upon the
Railroad Valuation Act is of little relevance in determining the proper
meaning of the Power Act. In the former case, omissions and deficiencies
in original cost are corrected for by a consideration of other elements of
vatue, primarily cost of reproduction which is so estimated as to include
all necessary and legitimate costs. Where, on the other hand, actual rea-
sonable cost is to be in itself the base, no such correcting factors are present,
and it would seem therefore that deficiencies in cost would have to be
supplied from estimates in order to obtain the total' qctual cost to the
utility of its property. 79 This, indeed, has been the view uniformly taken
by those state commissions 80 and writers 81 favoring the cost basis in
the Act requires'that all water rights, interests in land, etc. are to be included
only at cost. 41 STAT. 1072, 1074 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §§ 807, 813 (1926)
75. Opinion, at 17.
76. Reply Brief for Licensee, at 44.
77. Opinion, at 17. Such a position, while it is questioned with respect to
a situation like that presented in the Mitchell Dam case where the investigation
relates back to the era before governmental regulation of accounts, would with-
out doubt be quite justified in instances in which a licensee had failed to main-
tain accurate records of costs incurred subsequent to the passage of the Federal
Water Power Act and the prescription of a system of accounts thereunder.
78. Re Texas Midland Railroad, supra note 68, at 8; Re Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Rr. Co. 134 I. C. C. 1, 10 (1927) ; Re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Ry. Co., 24 I. C. C. (Val. Rep.) 709, 712 (1929).
79. Cf. FLOY, op. cit. supr note 68, at 65-66.
80. Re Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., P. U. R. 1931A, 132, 137 (Cal.
R. C. 1930) (citing many previous California decisions to the same effect);
Re Laporte Gas & Electric Co., P. U. R. 1921A, 824, 863-864 (Ind. P. S. C.
1920). The various Massachusetts commissions, popularly regarded as the
greatest exponents of the investment cost rule, havp also employed estimates
for determining fair original cost where that could not be found from the out-
standing securities because of the absence of regulatory supervision at the
time of issuance of a part of those securities. BARNES, op. cit. supra note 59,
at 117.
Moreover, many state commissions and writers, though adhering to the rule
of Smyth v. Ames, hold that in calculating original cost resort to estimates is
[Vol.42
1932] COMMENTS
utility valuation. And while allowances for promotion expenses should
err on the side of conservativeness and not be made where there is no
evidence that such costs were actually incurred,82 yet there exists a general
unanimity of opinion to the effect that where, as here, there is reasonable
certainty that expenditures of this type were made,8 3 an estimated amount
should be included to cover them to the extent that they may properly be
regarded as having been necessary and legitimate.-1 The inclusion of
some allowance for them, however conservatively made, would also cer-
tainly be of strategical advantage to the Commission in case of appeals
to the courts.
The contention that the Commission failed to correctly interpret the
meaning of the phrase "actual legitimate original cost" did not constitute
licensee's only criticism of the Commission's method of valuation. It also
urged that a proper construction of the Act would dictate the inclusion
of all property acquired prior to its passage at the fair value of that prop-
erty as of the date of the license, not at its actual original cost.es This
contention it founded upon Section 23 of the Act which provides in sub-
stance that in case of projects already constructed when application for a
license is made, the fair value of the project shall be taken as the net
necessary where accounting records are unavailable or cannot be relied upon.
See 1 WHrrmTN-Wmcox, op. cit. supra note 60, c. 14 (citations and discussion);
Re Boise Water Co., P. U. R. 1926D, 321, 353; Re Salmon River Power & Light
Co., P. U. R. 1926E, 728, 734, both Idaho P. U. C. 1926; Wichita Gas Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 126 Kan. 220, 221, 268 Pac. 111 (1928) (Ran.
P. S. C. had estimated cost in the absence of records showing actual expendi-
tures); Aluminum Goods Manufacturing Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., P. U. R.
1927B, 1, 5-7 (Mo. P. S. C. 1926); Re United Railways Co. of St. Louis, P. U. R.
1928E, 419, 452 (Mo. P. S. S. 1928), aff'd, State v. Public Service Commission,
326 Mo. 751, 771, 34 S. W. (2d) 507, 515 (1930).
81. BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 105-106;
Goddard, Public Utility Valuation (1917) 15 MicH. L. REv. 205, 224.
82. West Palm Beach Water Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, P. U. R. 1930A,
177, 199 (U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. Fla. 1929).
83. The Commission recognizes that some expenses were incurred in the
way of preliminary investigation and promotion. Opinion, at 16-17. The testi-
mony before the Federal Trade Commission of Mr. Thomas W. Martin, Presi-
dent of the Alabama Power Company, though undoubtedly presenting an estimate
of those expenditures much in excess of any figure which could be allowed,
indicates the actuality of such costs. Federal Trade Commission, supra note
5, at 105-110. The expenditures of the promotional period here under con-
sideration should not be confused with the organization and preliminary in-
vestigation costs allowed by the Commission. The latter related to the period
of active construction. PRELIINARY ACCOUNTING REPORT, 15, 13-19, 23.
84. Bay State Rate Case, P. U. R. 1916F, 221, 245-248 (Mass. P. S. C. 1916);
State v. Public Service Commission, supra note 80, at 771, 34 S. W. (2d) at 515,
aff'g Re United Railways Co. of St. Louis, supra note 80 at 454; Dunn v. Rut-
land Railway, Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1923C, 316, 329-330 (Vt. P. S. C.
1923); BAUER, op. cit. svpra note 81, at 106, 216; FLOY, op. cit. s.,pra note 68,
at 65-66; 2 WHrrrEN-WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 60, at 1091.
85. Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 38-40.
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investment of the applicant as of the date of such license. Construed in
its context, this provision seems to bear out the Company's position and
to indicate on the part of Congress an attempt to circumvent any possible
constitutional entanglements arising out of retroactive legislation which
appears to take property without due process.80 For it is clear from the
decisions of the Supreme Court that it is the value of utility property which
is protected by the Constitution 8 and that original cost is not the measure
of this value.88 Adherents of the investment rule and the more recent pro-
ponents of the fixed rate base recognize the possible constitutional invalidity
of the application of their proposals to already existing utility properties. 80
The former seek to overcome this defect in their proposition by showing
that the shift in the regulatory base would not be prejudicial to investors; 90
the latter, by somewhat similar observations reinforced with the explana-
tion that existing properties are to be included in the frozen base at their
fair value at the present time.0 ' But the arguments are in the main ad-
dressed to the economic aspects of the problem and, while persuasive, it
is questionable whether they could overcome in the minds of judges the
force of the constitutional objection.
92
86. See Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148 (1913).
87. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
88. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262
U. S. 276 (1923); St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461
(1929).
89. Bauer, The Fixed Rate Base (1930) 6 Pus. UTiL. FOurNIGHTLY 22, 25;
Bickley, Public Utility Valuation for Rate Purposes (1926) 16 AM. EcON. REV.
28, 38-39; Bonbright, The Economic Merits of Original Cost and Reproduotion
Cost (1928)-41 HARv. L. Rnv. 593, 594-595; Ryan, Let Congress Fix the Utility
Rate Base (1930) 5 PuB. UTir. FORTNIGHTLY 756, 759. See also FLOY, Op. cit.
supra note 68, at 28-30.
90. Bonbright, supra note 89, at 614; Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallaoy
in Rate Cases (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 710, 718-720. But of. FLOY, op. cit. eUpra
note 68, at 63-64.
91.' Bauer, supra note 89, at 25; Bauer, What is Unconstitutional About ct
Fixed Rate Base? (1930) 6 PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY 669, passim.
92. See Wherry, Is a Fixed Rate Base Constitutional? (1930) 6 Pun. iUTIL.
FORTNIGHTLY 611. If, by judicial construction of the Power Act, it did become
necessary to find the fair value of the assets which licensee had acquired prior
to 1920, an interesting valuation problem would arise from the fact that the
law contemplates the use of the calculated base in both rate regulation and
later government purchase. In valuation for rate making the capitalization
of earnings is not considered in finding fair value, the base being determined
from a consideration of past and contemporary costs. BAUER, op. cit. suprt
note 81, at 69-70; HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 43, at 81, 93; Craven, supra
note 43, passim. But with valuation for public purchase it is customary to
give substantial weight to discounted earning power. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN (2d ed. 1917) 664-665, 681-682; 1 WHniTEN-WLcox, op. cit. supra note
60, at 64-67; Craven, supra note 43, at 686-687. The dissimilarity between these
two types of valuation is discussed in HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 43, at 57.
The commission might thus be again met with the problem of determining upon
the legitimacy of licensee's proposed method of valuation.
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From the above discussion it appears that the Commission's position,
like that of the Power Company, is perhaps open to attack. Yet there is
no way whereby the licensee can immediately secure a judicial review.
Determinations by the Commission like that here made have recently been
held to be purely administrative in character, raising no judicial question
on which resort to the courts may be had,93 and this holding is without
doubt in accord with the views of the Supreme Court which has ruled that
final valuations by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Railroad
Valuation Act are but administrative determinations not open to attack
by the carriers affected.9 As was argued in the railroad cases,03 this
inability on the part of the utilities to secure a hearing until a judicial
question is presented places them at a disadvantage, for the weight given
at that later time to the administrative findings will be difficult to over-
come. It is this situation which explains the licensee's unsuccessful effort
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Power Commission to make a formal
determination of costs in advance of any attempt at regulation of rates
or ascertainment of purchase price.00 And in view of the possibility that
the Commission will have little occasion to exercise its powers over rates OT
this question as to the correctness of its present determination may well
remain unanswered until the end of the license period, or at least until
the period of amortization of excessive earnings has been reached after
twenty years of operation.
93. Clarion River Power Co. v. Smith, 59 F. (2d) 861 (App. D. C. 1932).
94. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Rr. Co., 273 U. S. 299 (1927),
rev'g 4 F. (2d) 736 and 8 F. (2d) 747; United States and Interstate Commerce
Commission v. The Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 275 U. S. 500 (1927), 7cv'g
19 F. (2d) 591. The lower federal courts had held that the carriers were suffi-
ciently affected by these final valuations to warrant and necessitate the taking
of jurisdiction.
95. See, especially, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 19 F. (2d)
591 (W. D. Mo. 1926).
96. See Brief of Alabama Power Company, at 6-15.
97. See Du Puy, supra note 63, at 79.
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